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</a><br><br><p class="index_head1">Proposed reforms are far from perfect</p><p class="byline">BARRY KAY</p><table align="right" bgcolor="#ffffff" border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" width="175"><tbody><tr><td width="175">
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<td align="left"><font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" size="1"><p>BARRY KAY</p></font></td>
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</td></tr></tbody></table> <p>Let me clarify
at the outset that, notwithstanding the comments below, on Oct. 10, I
will vote to support the electoral reforms proposed by the Ontario
Citizens' Assembly. I will do so, not because it represents an ideal
solution -- it doesn't -- but because I feel it is an improvement upon
the status quo.</p><p>Still, the language of superlatives and absolutes
applied to the proposal by such supporters as Fair Vote Canada is
misplaced, to the point of being misleading.</p><p>There is no question
that the present plurality (first-past-the-post) electoral system
typically creates significant disparities -- and at times huge
disparities -- and that any variation of proportional representation is
much more equitable. That is true by definition.</p><p>That
acknowledged, it should also be pointed out that when it comes to
electoral systems, there is no silver bullet of one ideal process
superior to others in all regards. Each one has strengths and
weaknesses, which can be compared on their merits by Ontario's
electorate. For example, while proportional representation, or more
precisely its mixed member proportional application, is clearly
superior by the standard of equity, it has drawbacks by such other
criteria as government stability.</p><p>Adoption of the citizens'
assembly proposal would permanently preclude the prospect of majority
governments. In addition, it would almost certainly mean the
proliferation of political parties.</p><p>The cumulative impact of
these phenomena mean, that in future elections we might know the
parliamentary seat distribution on election night, but not necessarily
the identity of the prime minister, or what grouping of parties would
collectively form the government. These matters would be subject to
multi-party discussions -- indeed, secret backroom negotiations where
various parties would set out bargaining demands for cabinet seats and
policy commitments in return for supporting another party in
government. Such deliberations would be the rule, not the exception,
and are the model in many European democracies that utilize comparable
systems such as Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.</p><p>The most
comparable example with which to assess the influence such reform would
have here, would be the impact upon New Zealand since its adoption in
1996. What happened there, as elsewhere, has been the increase in
parties and the reduction in vote share, if not the fragmentation of
the pre-existing parties. Probable new groups to gain representation in
Ontario would be the Green and Family Coalition parties, whose support
will likely increase at least initially, because they will no longer be
dismissed as wasted votes.</p><p>However, over time, additional new
parties will also likely emerge, probably from the splintering of
pre-existing parties. The NDP, the most avid supporters among
established parties, because they are most consistently penalized by
the current system, might well see their vote share decline in the
future over internal divisions, as will the Liberals and Conservatives.</p><p>The
future dynamic for government formation will focus upon moderate-left
groupings of parties, whose members will attack each other in election
campaigns and then coalesce into bargaining in the aftermath, versus
moderate-right groupings doing precisely the same thing. Less
ideological special interest parties might also emerge in time that
could join either side's coalition, and hence would have greater
bargaining leverage. A possible example of this might be a Grey party
asserting pensioners' rights, and bid for their inclusion from either
side in return for commitment to their agenda priorities.</p><p>Coalitions
would be less stable with a broader range of possible partners, and
governments will fall more frequently, though not always necessitating
new elections.</p><p>These are all tendencies which are more likely to
occur with a system change. The degree to which they actually occur
will vary with circumstances.</p><p>Had the citizens' assembly
recommended a five per cent threshold for parliamentary inclusion, as
in Germany, rather than one of three per cent, the degree of stability
would have been somewhat greater. Another element that might have been
considered was a sunset provision to the reform. This would have
mandated a subsequent referendum at some future point, perhaps 10 or 15
years hence, when Ontarians, having become familiar with the changes
could choose whether to reauthorize the new system.</p><p>As it stands,
if implemented the mixed member proportional system is unlikely to be
substantially altered in the future. There will be no going back, as
smaller parties elected under this process will have a vested interest
in maintaining the new status quo.</p><p>There will be other changes as
well, including a probable increase in the number of women and
minorities being elected to seats from the party lists, although it
isn't clear that this will have significant policy implications in and
of itself. In fact, a potential conflict might emerge between
constituency and list candidates for each party.</p><p>The better a
party does in constituency contests, the lesser the likelihood that
list candidates from that party will win seats. Using 2003 data for
example, no Liberal party list candidates would have been elected at
all, and in 1999 very few list Conservatives would have won seats. In
addition, constituency elected members will develop a greater measure
of independence because of their local popularity, and will be more
able to effectively defy their parliamentary leaders, should they wish.</p><p>The
ultimate effect of this will be less decisive policy making. There will
be no future "common sense revolutions" nor will there likely be
governments dominated by socialists. Policy disputes that divide
coalition governments will lessen the prospect for bold action of any
ideological stripe, and could lead to a game of musical chairs in the
rotation of smaller parties represented in government.</p><p>Again, this discussion is simply a reminder that no single electoral reform is a panacea to cure all political problems.</p><p>"Policy
disputes that divide coalition governments will lessen the prospect for
bold action of any ideological stripe, and could lead to a game of
musical chairs in the rotation of smaller parties represented in the
government. "</p><p>Barry Kay is a professor of political science at Wilfrid Laurier University.</p><br>