[fvc-wat-disc] Barry Kay in The Record today

[Derek Kraan]

http://www.therecord.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=record/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1188198946035&call_pageid=1024322168441&col=1024322596091

Proposed reforms are far from perfect

BARRY KAY

    BARRY KAY
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Let me clarify at the outset that, notwithstanding the comments below, on
Oct. 10, I will vote to support the electoral reforms proposed by the
Ontario Citizens' Assembly. I will do so, not because it represents an ideal
solution -- it doesn't -- but because I feel it is an improvement upon the
status quo.

Still, the language of superlatives and absolutes applied to the proposal by
such supporters as Fair Vote Canada is misplaced, to the point of being
misleading.

There is no question that the present plurality (first-past-the-post)
electoral system typically creates significant disparities -- and at times
huge disparities -- and that any variation of proportional representation is
much more equitable. That is true by definition.

That acknowledged, it should also be pointed out that when it comes to
electoral systems, there is no silver bullet of one ideal process superior
to others in all regards. Each one has strengths and weaknesses, which can
be compared on their merits by Ontario's electorate. For example, while
proportional representation, or more precisely its mixed member proportional
application, is clearly superior by the standard of equity, it has drawbacks
by such other criteria as government stability.

Adoption of the citizens' assembly proposal would permanently preclude the
prospect of majority governments. In addition, it would almost certainly
mean the proliferation of political parties.

The cumulative impact of these phenomena mean, that in future elections we
might know the parliamentary seat distribution on election night, but not
necessarily the identity of the prime minister, or what grouping of parties
would collectively form the government. These matters would be subject to
multi-party discussions -- indeed, secret backroom negotiations where
various parties would set out bargaining demands for cabinet seats and
policy commitments in return for supporting another party in government.
Such deliberations would be the rule, not the exception, and are the model
in many European democracies that utilize comparable systems such as
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.

The most comparable example with which to assess the influence such reform
would have here, would be the impact upon New Zealand since its adoption in
1996. What happened there, as elsewhere, has been the increase in parties
and the reduction in vote share, if not the fragmentation of the
pre-existing parties. Probable new groups to gain representation in Ontario
would be the Green and Family Coalition parties, whose support will likely
increase at least initially, because they will no longer be dismissed as
wasted votes.

However, over time, additional new parties will also likely emerge, probably
from the splintering of pre-existing parties. The NDP, the most avid
supporters among established parties, because they are most consistently
penalized by the current system, might well see their vote share decline in
the future over internal divisions, as will the Liberals and Conservatives.

The future dynamic for government formation will focus upon moderate-left
groupings of parties, whose members will attack each other in election
campaigns and then coalesce into bargaining in the aftermath, versus
moderate-right groupings doing precisely the same thing. Less ideological
special interest parties might also emerge in time that could join either
side's coalition, and hence would have greater bargaining leverage. A
possible example of this might be a Grey party asserting pensioners' rights,
and bid for their inclusion from either side in return for commitment to
their agenda priorities.

Coalitions would be less stable with a broader range of possible partners,
and governments will fall more frequently, though not always necessitating
new elections.

These are all tendencies which are more likely to occur with a system
change. The degree to which they actually occur will vary with
circumstances.

Had the citizens' assembly recommended a five per cent threshold for
parliamentary inclusion, as in Germany, rather than one of three per cent,
the degree of stability would have been somewhat greater. Another element
that might have been considered was a sunset provision to the reform. This
would have mandated a subsequent referendum at some future point, perhaps 10
or 15 years hence, when Ontarians, having become familiar with the changes
could choose whether to reauthorize the new system.

As it stands, if implemented the mixed member proportional system is
unlikely to be substantially altered in the future. There will be no going
back, as smaller parties elected under this process will have a vested
interest in maintaining the new status quo.

There will be other changes as well, including a probable increase in the
number of women and minorities being elected to seats from the party lists,
although it isn't clear that this will have significant policy implications
in and of itself. In fact, a potential conflict might emerge between
constituency and list candidates for each party.

The better a party does in constituency contests, the lesser the likelihood
that list candidates from that party will win seats. Using 2003 data for
example, no Liberal party list candidates would have been elected at all,
and in 1999 very few list Conservatives would have won seats. In addition,
constituency elected members will develop a greater measure of independence
because of their local popularity, and will be more able to effectively defy
their parliamentary leaders, should they wish.

The ultimate effect of this will be less decisive policy making. There will
be no future "common sense revolutions" nor will there likely be governments
dominated by socialists. Policy disputes that divide coalition governments
will lessen the prospect for bold action of any ideological stripe, and
could lead to a game of musical chairs in the rotation of smaller parties
represented in government.

Again, this discussion is simply a reminder that no single electoral reform
is a panacea to cure all political problems.

"Policy disputes that divide coalition governments will lessen the prospect
for bold action of any ideological stripe, and could lead to a game of
musical chairs in the rotation of smaller parties represented in the
government. "

Barry Kay is a professor of political science at Wilfrid Laurier University.
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